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INTRODUCTION
Justice Sandra Day O’Conner wrote in Troxel v. Granville, “The
demographic changes of the past century make it difficult to speak of
an average American family.”1 When assessing societal trends for
cohabiting couples2 and their families, Justice O’Connor’s statement
rings true.
While the number of adults getting married in the U.S. has been
falling, the number of couples living in cohabiting relationships is on
the rise.3 Since 1990, the number of households led by persons in
cohabiting relationships has nearly doubled from 3.1 million (3.4%) in
* J.D. candidate, May 2017, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology; A.M., 2008, School of Social Service Administration, University of
Chicago. The author would like to thank Matthew Kita for his suggestions and
editorial assistance and Meaghan Sweeney, Emily P. Linehan, and Professor Hal
Morris for their early feedback on this Comment.
1
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 63 (2000).
2
In this article, the term “cohabiting” refers to two unmarried persons who live
together and likely engage in a sexual relationship. E.g., Cohabitation, BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
3
PAUL TAYLOR ET AL., THE DECLINE OF MARRIAGE AND RISE OF NEW
FAMILIES 21 (Pew Research Center 2010) (noting the percent of American adults
who are married decreased from seventy-two percent in 1960 to fifty-two percent in
2008).
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1990 to 6.2 million (5.5%) in 2008.4 In 1990, over 2.1 million children
aged seventeen and younger lived with two cohabiting parents. In
2008, this number more than doubled to over 4.5 million children—
about 6% of all children in the United States.5 “[T]wo of every five
children in the United States will spend time in a cohabiting household
before the age of sixteen.”6
In 2015, about 40% of all births in the United States were to
unmarried women7—up from just 5% in 1960.8 The total number of
births to unmarried women increased from 89,500 in 19409 to
1,601,527 in 2015.10 Today, the majority of births to unmarried women
are to women in cohabiting relationships.11 The percent of births to
cohabiting women increased from 41% in 2002 to 58% in 2010.12
Nearly half of all births to unmarried, cohabiting women were
intended pregnancies.13
The trend of fewer couples getting married but still having
children poses interesting legal challenges. For example, The Hague
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction
4

Id. at 112.
CYNTHIA GRANT BOWMAN, UNMARRIED COUPLES, LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY
159 (2010); TAYLOR ET AL., supra note 3, at 113.
6
BOWMAN, supra note 5, at 159.
7
Joyce A. Martin et al., Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, Births: Final
Data for 2015, 66 NAT’L VITAL STAT. REP., January 5, 2017, at 1, 8.
8
PAUL TAYLOR ET AL., GENERATION GAP IN VALUES, BEHAVIORS: AS
MARRIAGE AND PARENTHOOD DRIFT APART, PUBLIC IS CONCERNED ABOUT SOCIAL
IMPACT 15 (Pew Research Center 2007).
9
Sally C. Curtin et al., Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, Recent
Declines in Nonmarital Childbearing in the United States, NCHS DATA BRIEF,
Aug. 2014, at 1, 2 (noting the number of births to unmarried mothers was 665,747 in
1980; 1,527,034 in 2005; and 1,726,566 in 2008). The report also notes that the
nonmarital birth rate has been on the decline for the past five years. Id.
10
Martin et al., supra note 7, at 8.
11
TAYLOR ET AL., supra note 3, at 67.
12
Curtin et al., supra note 9, at 4.
13
Id.
5
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(Hague Convention or Convention) protects parents with primary
custody rights from parental abduction or retention of their children in
another country.14 Under the Hague Convention, courts apply the
domestic laws of the child’s country of habitual residence—a term
described in greater detail below—immediately before the alleged
abduction or retention to determine whether one parent has violated
the other’s rights of custody.15 However, when unmarried couples have
children, they do not always obtain court orders identifying each
parent’s custody or visitation rights; they instead prefer to follow
informal parenting arrangements.16
In light of demographic trends towards fewer marriages, should
jurisdictions like Illinois adopt child custody and paternity rules that
endow rights of custody to both parents at birth or upon
acknowledgement of the child? Two recent Seventh Circuit cases
applying The Hague Convention demonstrate what is at stake.
In Garcia v. Pinelo, Raul Salazar Garcia (Salazar) and Emely
Galvan Pinelo (Galvan) never married nor lived together.17 But they
did have a son together, D.S., in Mexico in 2002.18 In 2013, Galvan
married another man, Rogelio Hernandez, and they decided to move to
the United States.19 Salazar agreed for D.S. to accompany Galvan to
Illinois for one year.20 After one year, when Galvan refused to return
D.S. to Mexico, Salazar filed his petition under the Hague Convention
to return his son to Mexico.21 In Garcia, the child’s habitual residence
was Mexico. Applying Mexican domestic law, the Northern District of
14

Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction,
Oct. 25, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11670, 1343 U.N.T.S. 89 (1980) [hereinafter Hague
Convention].
15
Id.
16
See Solangel Maldonado, Illegitimate Harm: Law, Stigma, and
Discrimination Against Nonmarital Children, 63 FLA. L. REV. 345, 355–56 (2011).
17
Garcia v. Pinelo, 808 F.3d 1158, 1159 (7th Cir. 2015).
18
Id.
19
Id. at 1160.
20
Id.
21
Id.
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Illinois found that Salazar had a right of custody under the Hague
Convention and the Mexican law convention of patria potestad
(parental authority).22 Consequently, Galvan violated Salazar’s
parental rights by retaining D.S. in Illinois.23 The Seventh Circuit
affirmed this decision.24
In Martinez v. Cahue, Jaded Ruvalcaba Martinez and Peter Cahue
had a son, A.M., in Illinois in 2006.25 Martinez and Cahue never
married.26 After their relationship ended, Martinez—who was a
Mexican citizen—moved to Mexico with A.M. in 2013.27 In 2014,
after Martinez sent A.M. to Illinois to spend his summer break with
Cahue, Cahue refused to return A.M. to Mexico.28 Consequently,
Martinez filed emergency proceedings in the Northern District of
Illinois under the Hague Convention to return her son to Mexico.29
The Northern District of Illinois found that because the parents did not
have a shared intent for A.M. to relocate to Mexico, A.M.’s habitual
residence under the Hague Convention remained Illinois and therefore
A.M. should remain in Illinois.30 However, the Seventh Circuit
reversed the Northern District of Illinois. 31 The Seventh Circuit found
that before Martinez moved to Mexico, she had sole custody of A.M.
22

Id. at 1159. In Latin, patria potestas means “power of the father.” Patricia
Begné, Parental Authority and Child Custody in Mexico, 38 FAM. L. QTRLY 527,
527 (Bruce McCann, trans., 2005). Today, in Mexico, the patria potestas
convention, known in Spanish as patria potestad, references “parental authority.” Id.
This paper will primarily refer to the parental authority convention by its Latin
spelling, patria potestas, since that is how the Seventh Circuit typically references
the convention.
23
Garcia, 808 F.3d at 1159.
24
Id.
25
Martinez v. Cahue, 826 F.3d 983, 987 (7th Cir. 2016).
26
Id. at 986.
27
Id. at 987.
28
Id. at 988.
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Id. at 991–92.
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under Illinois law and that Cahue had no right of custody to prevent
Martinez from moving to Mexico.32
As described above, the domestic relations laws of one country
over another can be outcome determinative. In Garcia, the Seventh
Circuit found that Mexican law provides a right of custody to both
parents known as patria potestas (parental authority) from the child’s
birthdate or acknowledgment of paternity.33 In contrast, the Seventh
Circuit found in Martinez that Illinois law presumes a mother has sole
custody of a child born to unmarried parents in the absence of a court
order. Unlike the Mexican laws of parental authority, Illinois law does
not imbue an unmarried parent—even those who have acknowledged
paternity—with custody rights.34
In an era where fewer people are getting married but still having
children, should jurisdictions like Illinois adopt child custody and
paternity rules that endow rights of custody to both parents at birth or
upon acknowledgement of the child? In order to protect children’s best
interests and to preserve the status quo before an alleged wrongful
retention or abduction, Illinois should not adopt a rule like parental
authority laws. Illinois’s presumption requires a court to consider
children’s best interests before awarding custody and visitation rights
while parental authority laws automatically confers decision-making
authority to parents. Children’s best interests are better served when a
court protects stability and the status quo in children’s lives rather than
enabling a parent to assert parental rights for the first time under a
Hague Convention petition.
This Comment will proceed as follows. Part I describes the
provisions of The Hague Convention as well as compares the
development of custody rights in Illinois and Mexico. Part II reviews
the factual and procedural context of Garcia v. Pinelo and Part III does
the same for Martinez v. Cahue. Part IV argues that Illinois’s
presumption that an unmarried mother has sole legal custody of her
32

Id.
See Garcia v. Pinelo, 808 F.3d 1158, 1166 (7th Cir. 2015).
34
Martinez, 826 F.3d at 991.
33
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children in the absence of a court order is a better right of custody rule
than the parental authority laws.
I. BACKGROUND
With rapid globalization in the late twentieth century, more people
have begun marrying people from other countries.35 One of the
challenges of increasingly open borders and easier means of travel is
international parental child abduction.36 In order to create streamlined
processes for returning children wrongfully removed or retained from
their proper home country, more than twenty-three countries gathered
in The Hague to create and adopt the Hague Convention on the Civil
Aspects of International Child Abduction (the Convention).37 As of
March 8, 2017, ninety-seven countries have either ratified or are in the
process of being accepted as members to the Convention.38 The
following sections will describe the provisions of the Convention as
well as differences between the development of child custody laws in
the United States and Mexico.
A. The Hague Convention
In 1981, the United States signed The Hague Convention and later
implemented it in 1988 when Congress adopted the International Child

35

E.g., Kristy Horvath and Margaret Ryznar, Protecting the Parent-Child
Relationship, 47 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 303, 303 (2015); Stephen I. Winter,
Note, Home is Where the Heart Is: Determining “Habitual Residence” Under the
Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, 33 J.L. &
POL’Y. 351, 351–52 (2010).
36
Winter, supra note 35, at 351.
37
Hague Convention, supra note 14.
38
Status Table: Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of
International Child Abduction, HAGUE CONF. ON PRIV. INT’L L.,
https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/status-table/?cid=24 (last updated
March 8, 2017).
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Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA).39 ICARA “entitles a person whose
child has been abducted to the United States to petition in federal court
for the return of the child.”40
“[The Convention] is fundamentally ‘an anti-abduction treaty.’”41
Its stated purpose is to “secure the prompt return of children
wrongfully removed to or retained in any Contracting State” and to
guarantee that the “rights of custody and of access” are respected
across states that have adopted the convention.42
Several public policies undergird the Convention. First, protecting
the interests of children permeates the convention.43 Within the goal of
protecting children’s interests is the presumption that stability is
important to child development.44 When children are wrongfully
moved from one country to another, they are torn from close-knit
family members and friends, school settings, and religious
institutions.45 The Convention is designed to return children to a status
quo where parents can then contest custody rights.46
Second, the Convention deters parents from international forum
shopping. In other words, the Convention discourages parents from
abducting their children and taking them to a country where the
parents believe the country’s courts will be more sympathetic to
39

International Child Abduction Remedies Act, Pub. L. No. 100-300, 102 Stat.
437 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. §§ 9001–9011 (2012)).
40
Koch v. Koch, 450 F.3d 703, 711 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing 42 U.S.C.
§ 11603(b), transferred to 42 U.S.C. § 9003(b) (2012)).
41
Martinez v. Cahue, 826 F.3d 983, 989 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Garcia v.
Pinelo, 808 F.3d 1158, 1162 (7th Cir. 2015)).
42
Hague Convention, supra note 14, at art. 3, 1343 U.N.T.S. at 98–99.
43
Id. at Preamble, 1343 U.N.T.S. at 98.
44
Elisa Perez-Vera, Explanatory Report, ¶ 24, 3 ACTS AND DOCUMENTS OF
THE FOURTEENTH SESSION, CHILD ABDUCTION 431–32 (1982) [hereafter Perez-Vera
Report].
45
Id. ¶ 24, 3. See Hague International Child Abduction Convention: Text and
Legal Analysis, 51 Fed. Reg. 10,494, 10,504 (Mar. 26, 1986).
46
International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 9001(b)(4)
(2012).

272

Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2017

7

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 10

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 12, Issue 1

Fall 2016

granting custody or decision-making rights over the children.47 Since
states that have adopted the Convention agree to respect the “rights of
custody and of access” of other member states, parents should have
less incentive to engage in international tactical gamesmanship over
their children.48
The Convention applies only to member countries and to children
who have been wrongfully removed or retained in member countries.49
Pursuant to Article 3 of the Convention, children are wrongfully
removed when:
a) it is in breach of rights of custody attributed to a person,
an institution or any other body, either jointly or alone,
under the law of the State in which the child was
habitually resident immediately before the removal or
retention; and
b) at the time of removal or retention those rights were
actually exercised, either jointly or alone, or would
have been so exercised but for the removal or
retention.50
In other words, a child is wrongfully removed or retained where the
parent who abducts or retains the child violates the “rights of custody”
of the other parent who actively asserted his or her rights as a parent.
“Rights of custody” is a term of art in the Convention that is not
directly synonymous with child custody jurisprudence in the United
States.51 The Convention defines rights of custody as “rights relating
47

Winter, supra note 35, at 353–54.
Id.
49
51 Fed. Reg. at 10,504–505.
50
Hague Convention, supra note 14, at art. 3, 1343 U.N.T.S. at 98–99
(emphasis added).
51
51 Fed. Reg. at 10,506-07; see also Melissa S. Wills, Note, Interpreting the
Hague Convention on International Child Abduction: Why American Courts Need to
Reconcile the Rights of Non-Custodial Parents, the Best Interests of Abducted
48
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to the care of the person of the child and, in particular, the right to
determine the child’s place of residence.”52
The Convention also defines “right[s] of access” as “includ[ing]
the right to take the child for a limited period of time to a place other
than the child’s habitual residence.”53 The important distinction
between rights of custody and rights of access is that the Convention
only offers a return order for a breach of rights of custody.54 In other
words, if a parent only has rights of access, he does not have a return
order remedy under the Convention; he can only request that a
Contracting State protect and enforce his rights of access.55
Courts deciding Convention cases are not to consider the merits of
underlying custody issues between the parties.56 Instead, courts are to
focus on deciding where the child should be returned so that the courts
in that jurisdiction can resolve the merits of any underlying custody
disputes.57
As such, courts do not enforce custody orders under the
Convention.58 The Convention’s rationale for not enforcing custody
orders is so that persons who wrongfully remove or retain a child
cannot “insulate the child from the Convention’s return provisions
merely by obtaining a custody order in the country of new residence,
or by seeking there to enforce another country’s order.”59 The
Convention reduces a parent’s incentives to abduct his children by
requiring courts to apply the domestic laws of the child’s country of
Children, and the Underlying Objectives of the Hague Convention, 25 REV. LITIG.
423, 441 (2006).
52
Hague Convention, supra note 14, at art. 5, 1343 U.N.T.S. at 99.
53
Id.
54
Id. at art. 3 & 8, 1343 U.N.T.S. at 98–100.
55
Id. at art. 21, 1343 U.N.T.S. at 102.
56
Id. at art. 19, 1343 U.N.T.S. at 101.
57
Hague International Child Abduction Convention: Text and Legal Analysis,
51 Fed. Reg. 10,494, 10,505 (Mar. 26, 1986); Perez-Vera Report, supra note 44,
¶ 19, 3.
58
51 Fed. Reg. at 10,504–505.
59
Id.
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habitual residence immediately before the alleged abduction or
retention to determine whether one parent has violated the other’s
rights of custody.60
The Convention does not define the term “habitual resident.”61
The Convention drafters did not want to bind courts to narrow legal
definitions of nationality or domicile in order to give courts greater
flexibility and thereby increase their ability to achieve the best
interests of children.62
The determination of a child’s habitual residence is often outcome
determinative.63 For example, if the court finds that the child is
presently located in her state of habitual residence, then her presence
in the country is not wrongful.64 However, if the court finds that the
child is not presently located in her country of habitual residence, then
her presence in the country is likely wrongful unless the petitioning
parent did not exercise his or her rights of custody.65
In determining the location of the child’s habitual residence, the
Seventh Circuit looks to whether parental intent to abandon the child’s
previous habitual residence exists and whether the child has
acclimatized to her new state of residence.66 Courts like the Seventh
Circuit reason that children, particularly in cases involving young
children, are not competent to make decisions about where they should
live.67 Instead, courts should determine whether there was a settled
parental intent to change the child’s habitual residence.68 The Seventh
60

Hague Convention, supra note 14, at art. 3, 1343 U.N.T.S. at 98-99.
See Mozes v. Mozes, 239 F.3d 1067, 1071 (9th Cir. 2001); Perez-Vera
Report, supra note 44, ¶¶ 66, 83 (“The Convention, following a long-established
tradition of the Hague Conference, does not define the legal concepts used by it.”).
62
E.g., Mozes, 239 F.3d at 1071–72.
63
E.g., Martinez v. Cahue, 826 F.3d 983, 988 (7th Cir. 2016).
64
E.g., Id.
65
E.g., Id.
66
Koch v. Koch, 450 F.3d 703, 713 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing Mozes, 239 F.3d
1067).
67
Mozes, 239 F.3d at 1076.
68
Id.
61
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Circuit has noted that “[t]he intention or purpose which has to be taken
into account is that of the person or persons entitled to fix the place of
the child’s residence.”69 In this manner, the court must consider
whether the intentions of one or both parents regarding where a child
will live are legally relevant. Such intent does not have to be preserved
in writing but can be inferred under the circumstances of each case.70
For example, courts can consider whether a family moved together
from one country to another, if the one parent unilaterally moved with
the child, if the move was for a defined period or indefinite, etc.71
The Seventh Circuit also considers the child’s acclimatization to
her new environment.72 Factors indicating a child’s depth of
acclimatization to a new environment include establishing friendships,
relationships with extended family, “success in school, and
participating in community and religious activities.”73 However, the
Seventh Circuit has found that “in the absence of settled parental
intent, courts should be slow to infer from [the child’s] contacts [with
a new state] that an earlier habitual residence has been abandoned.”74
B. U.S. v. Mexico: Comparing Custody Laws
In general, child custody is comprised of two components: legal
and physical custody.75 Legal custody is one or both parents’ ability to
make significant decisions on behalf of the child, such as decisions

69

Martinez, 826 F.3d at 990 (quoting Redmond v. Redmond, 724 F.3d 729,
747 (7th Cir. 2013)) (emphasis in original).
70
Koch, 450 F.3d at 713 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing Mozes, 239 F.3d at 1075–76).
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Martinez, 826 F.3d at 992.
74
Koch, 450 F.3d at 713 (quoting Mozes, 239 F.3d at 1079).
75
Horvath & Ryznar, supra note 35, at 305.
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regarding education, healthcare, and religious upbringing.76 Physical
custody centers on with which parent the child will live.77
As discussed above, The Hague Convention secures the prompt
return of children wrongfully removed or retained in a Contracting
state.78 Courts determine whether a child was wrongfully removed by
determining whether the parent who removed the child violated the
petitioning parent’s “rights of custody” under the laws of the child’s
state of habitual residence.79 Article III of the Convention provides in
pertinent part:
[R]ights of custody [. . .] may arise in particular by operation
of law or by reason of a judicial or administrative decision, or
by reason of an agreement having legal effect under the law
of that State.80
Because rights of custody may arise from three sources (by operation
of law, by judicial or administrative decision, or by effective
agreement), understanding the differences in custody laws between
Contracting states is crucial. The following sections will briefly
describe differences in how the United States and Mexico approach
custody law.
1.

United States

In the United States, child custody law derives from both statutes
and judicially created common law.81 Historically in the United States,
fathers received custody of their children as they were viewed as
76

Id.
Id.
78
Hague Convention, supra note 14, at art. 3, 1343 U.N.T.S. at 98-99.
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
Antoinette Sedillo López, International Law: U.S./Mexico Cross-Border
Child Abduction—The Need for Cooperation, 29 N.M. L. REV. 289, 294 (1999).
77
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assets to the father’s estate.82 By the mid-nineteenth century, societal
attitudes began to shift and the “tender years” doctrine emerged where
legislatures passed laws to award mothers custody of children if the
children were not yet old enough to work.83
Over time, states abandoned “tender years” statutes in favor of
those prescribing what is now commonly known as the “best interests
of the child” standard.84 The purpose of the child’s best interests
standard is to foster individualized determinations on a case-by-case
basis that consider which or both parents would advance the child’s
needs if he or she or both were given authority to make significant
decisions for the child.85
In the United States, the best interests of the child standard
originated in the English common law as an extension of parens
patriae (parent of the country),86 a common law doctrine, in part,
empowering the State “to substitute its authority for that of natural
parents over their children.”87 Custody statutes advancing the best
interests of the child standard often enumerate factors a judge should
consider in determining how to allocate custody to one or both
parents.88 For example, Section 602.5(c) of the Illinois Marriage and
Dissolution of Marriage Act (IMDMA) identifies fifteen best interest
factors courts should consider, including “the child’s adjustment to his
82

HERBERT JACOB, SILENT REVOLUTION: THE TRANSFORMATION OF DIVORCE
LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 127 (1988). See also Horvath & Ryznar, supra note 35,
at 305–06.
83
JACOB, supra note 82, at 128–29. See also Horvath & Ryznar, supra note 35,
at 305–07.
84
E.g., JACOB, supra note 82, at 130–31 (1988).
85
Horvath & Ryznar, supra note 35, at 309–10.
86
Julia Halloran McLaughlin, The Fundamental Truth About Best Interests, 54
St. Louis U. L.J. 113, 120-21 (2009).
87
Lawrence B. Custer, The Origins of the Doctrine of Parens Patriae, 27
EMORY L.J. 195, 195 (1978).
88
E.g., Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, 750 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 5/602.5(c)(1)–(15) (West, Westlaw through Pub. Act 99-937, 2016 Reg.
Sess.).
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or her home, school, and community”; “the level of each parent’s
participation in past significant decision-making with respect to the
child”; and “the willingness and ability of each parent to facilitate and
encourage a close and continuing relationship between the other parent
and the child.”89
In Illinois, for children of unmarried parents, the Illinois
Parentage Act of 2015 (Parentage Act) defers to the IMDMA
regarding custody and visitation proceedings.90 Section 802(a) of the
Parentage Act provides in pertinent part, “In determining the
allocation of parental responsibilities, relocation, parenting time,
parenting time interference, support for a non-minor disabled child,
educational expenses for a non-minor child, and related post-judgment
issues, the court shall apply the relevant standards of the [IMDMA].”91
Under the Parentage Act, unmarried parents can ask the Court
to adjudicate their custody rights in a judgment.92 However, if
unmarried parents have not adjudicated their rights through the courts,
then Illinois law presumes, in the absence of a court order, that
unmarried mothers have sole legal custody of their children.93
89

E.g., Id. §§ 5/602.5(c)(2), (5), & (11) (West, Westlaw through Pub. Act 99937, 2016 Reg. Sess.).
90
Illinois Parentage Act of 2015, 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 46/802(a) (West,
Westlaw through Pub. Act. 99-937, 2016 Reg. Sess.).
91
Id. Note: Public Acts 99-85 and 99-769 replaced the terms “custody” with
“allocation of parental responsibilities,” “visitation” with “parenting time,” and
“removal” with “relocation” in the Illinois Parentage Act of 2015 to conform with
the Illinois General Assembly’s elimination of “custody” from the IMDMA in favor
of “allocation of parental responsibilities.” Act of July 21, 2015, sec. 802, 2015 Ill.
Laws Pub. Act 99-85 (eff. Jan. 1, 2016); Act of Aug. 12, 2016, sec. 802, 2015 Ill.
Laws Pub. Act 99-769 (eff. Jan. 1, 2017).
92
Id. See, e.g., In re S.L., 765 N.E.2d 82, 85 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (holding that
an unmarried father who established a father-child relationship could seek custody
under the IMDMA and was entitled to a hearing to determine the child’s best
interests).
93
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/10-5(a)(3) (West, Westlaw through Pub.
Act. 99-937, 2016 Reg. Sess.) (“It is presumed that, when the parties have never
been married to each other, the mother has legal custody of the child unless a valid
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Additionally, in the United States, unmarried couples cannot
rely on private contracts or agreements related to child custody. In
most American jurisdictions, private contracts between parents
regarding child custody or support are void against public policy.94
The reason courts refuse to enforce contracts regarding child custody
and support is because such contracts may discourage parents from
pursuing litigation in their children’s best interests.95
2.

Mexico

Unlike the U.S. which follows the English common law tradition,
Mexico follows the Roman civil law tradition of codified laws.96 One
such Roman civil law tradition followed in Mexico is patria potestas
(Latin: power of the father) or, in Spanish, patria potestad.97
Historically, patria potestas gave fathers absolute power over their
children and that power endured for life.98 Today, patria potestas—
parental authority—has been defined as “the duty and the right of
court order states otherwise. If an adjudication of paternity has been completed and
the father has been assigned support obligations or visitation rights, such a paternity
order should, for the purposes of this Section, be considered a valid court order
granting custody to the mother.”) (emphasis added); Illinois Parentage Act of 2015,
§ 802(c) (“In the absence of an explicit order or judgment for the allocation of
parental responsibilities [formerly custody], the establishment of a child support
obligation or the allocation of parenting time to one parent shall be construed as an
order or judgment allocating all parental responsibilities to the other parent. If the
parentage order of judgment contains no such provisions, all parental
responsibilities shall be presumed to be allocated to the mother; however, the
presumption shall not apply if the child has resided primarily with the other parent
for at least 6 months prior to the date that the mother seeks to enforce the order or
judgment of parentage.”) (emphasis added).
94
E.g., In re Marriage of Linta, 2014 IL App (2d) 130862, ¶ 14, 18 N.E.3d
566, 570; Hurlbut v. Scarbrough, 957 P.2d 839, 842 (Wyo. 1998).
95
E.g., In re Marriage of Best, 901 N.E.2d 967, 970 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009).
96
Sedillo López, supra note 81, at 297.
97
Begné, supra note 22, at 527.
98
Id. at 529.
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parents to provide assistance and protection to the persons and the
property of their children to the degree necessary to fulfill their
children’s needs.”99 Parental authority gives both parents the right to
care and control their children and their children’s property.100
Included within the right to control their children is the right to decide
where the children live.101
In Mexico, divorce of married parents or separation of unmarried
parents does not automatically destroy parental authority rights.102
Consequently, a Mexican parent should not remove his or her child
without the other parent’s consent because both parents will maintain
parental authority over their child absent a court order saying
otherwise.103 This contrasts with the presumption in some American
states that in the absence of a contravening court order, an unmarried
mother has sole custody of her children.104 No such presumption of
custody rights exists for unmarried fathers or partners of natural
mothers.

99

Id. at 528 (citing IGNACIO GALINDO GARFIAS, DERECHO CIVIL MEXICANO
656 (1999)).
100
Código Civil Federal [CC], art. 413, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF]
14-05-1928, últimas reformas DOF 24-12-2013 (Mex.) (“La patria potestad se ejerce
sobre la persona y los bienes de los hijos. Su ejercicio queda sujeto en cuanto a la
guarda y educación de los menores, a las modalidades que le impriman las
resoluciones que se dicten, de acuerdo con la Ley sobre Previsión Social de la
Delincuencia Infantil en el Distrito Federal.”). See Sedillo López, supra note 81, at
297.
101
Sedillo López, supra note 81, at 297.
102
Código Civil Federal [CC], art. 416 (“En caso de separación de quienes
ejercen la patria potestad, ambos deberán continuar con el cumplimiento de sus
deberes y podrán convenir los términos de su ejercicio, particularmente en lo relativo
a la guarda y custodia de los menores.”); See Sedillo López, supra note 81, at 297.
103
Sedillo López, supra note 81, at 299.
104
E.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/10-5(a)(3) (West, Westlaw through Pub.
Act 99-937, 2016 Reg. Sess.); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 46/802(c) (West, Westlaw
through Pub. Act 99-937, 2016 Reg. Sess.).
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II. GARCIA V. PINELO
A. The Facts
Raul Salazar Garcia (Salazar) and Emely Galvan Pinelo (Galvan)
dated briefly in 2001.105 They never married and they never lived
together.106 Both are Mexican citizens, and, in 2002, both lived in
Mexico.107
During their brief relationship, Galvan and Salazar had a son,
D.S., who was born in Monterrey, Nuevo León, Mexico in 2002.108 In
2006, a Nuevo León court “entered a custody order recognizing
Galvan and Salazar as D.S.’s parents.”109 Galvan was awarded
physical custody of D.S. and Salazar was awarded weekly visitation,
which he regularly exercised.110
In 2013, Galvan married Rogelio Hernandez, an American
citizen.111 In July 2013, Salazar and Galvan met to discuss Galvan’s
desire to move to the United States.112 They both agreed that Galvan
would move to Chicago, Illinois with D.S. for one school year.113
In August 2013, Galvan and D.S. moved to Chicago and enrolled
D.S., now 11 years old, in school.114 Salazar remained in touch with
D.S. regularly through Skype and D.S. traveled to Mexico for winter
break.115 During this time, D.S. told his father that he would like to

105

Garcia v. Pinelo, 808 F.3d 1158, 1159 (7th Cir. 2015).
Id.
107
Id.
108
Id. at 1160.
109
Id.
110
Id.
111
Id.
112
Id.
113
Id.
114
Id.
115
Id.
106
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return to Mexico while simultaneously telling his mother he would
like to remain in Illinois.116
In July 2014, Salazar traveled to Chicago to take D.S. back to
Mexico.117 Galvan refused to allow D.S. to return to Mexico with
Salazar.118 Consequently, Salazar returned alone to Mexico where he
filed his petition under the Convention with the Mexican Central
Authority.119 On December 2, 2014, the U.S. Department of State filed
Salazar’s petition in the Northern District of Illinois.120
B. District Court Opinion
The Northern District of Illinois appointed D.S. a guardian ad
litem.121 In April 2015, D.S., now age 13, informed his guardian that
he would prefer to remain in Chicago.122 During an in camera hearing,
D.S. informed the judge that he wanted to remain in Chicago to finish
eighth grade and beyond that if he could attend a good high school in
Chicago.123 If he could not attend a good high school in Chicago, then
D.S. did not oppose returning to Mexico.124
In July 2015, the District Court found that Mexico was D.S.’s
country of habitual residence.125 The Court also found that Salazar had
the “right of patria potestas over D.S.,” which served as a right of
custody for purposes of the Convention.126 Consequently, the District
Court found that Galvan wrongfully detained D.S. in Illinois and that
116

Id.
Id.
118
Id.
119
Id.
120
Id.
121
Id.
122
Id.
123
Id. at 1160–61.
124
Id. at 1161.
125
Id.
126
Id.
117
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D.S. needed to be returned to Mexico unless D.S. met the “maturechild exception” of the Convention.127 The District Court found that
although D.S. objected to returning to Mexico and was old enough to
do so, retaining D.S. in Illinois would undermine the purposes of the
Convention.128 The court reasoned that a primary purpose of the
Convention is to deter parents from abducting their children to benefit
from another jurisdiction’s laws.129 Permitting D.S. to remain in the
United States would “set a precedent that allows a parent to prevent
the return of a child by problems of his or her own making.”130
C. Appeal to the Seventh Circuit
Galvan appealed from the judgment of the Northern District of
Illinois to the Seventh Circuit.131 The case was heard by a panel
consisting of Chief Judge Wood and Judges Manion and Hamilton.132
At issue for the court was (1) whether Salazar established his custody
rights under the Convention and (2) whether the District Court
exceeded its discretion when it refused to “allow D.S. to stay in the
United States pursuant to the Convention’s mature-child exception.”133
On appeal, the parties did not challenge the fact that Mexico is D.S.’s
habitual residence.134
Writing a unanimous opinion, Chief Judge Wood found that
Salazar did have an established right of custody under the Convention
through the Mexican law of patria potestas (parental authority).135

127

Id.
Id.
129
Id. at 1168.
130
Id. at 1168–69.
131
Id. at 1161.
132
Id. at 1159.
133
Id.
134
Id.
135
Id.
128
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Moreover, the Seventh Circuit found that the District Court did not
exceed its discretion by ordering D.S. to return to Mexico.136
1.

Patria Potestas (Parental Authority)

Chief Judge Wood recognized that the Seventh Circuit previously
recognized patria potestas as a “right of custody” within the meaning
of the Convention.137 The Court found that pursuant to the Nuevo
León laws, parental authority “attaches automatically at birth or
acknowledgment.”138 Since Salazar was D.S.’s acknowledged father
since 2006, the parental authority right attached.139 The Court also
found that although Galvan and Salazar entered into a custody
agreement in 2006 the agreement did not destroy Salazar’s right to
parental authority under Nuevo León law.140
2.

Mature-Child Exception

The Seventh Circuit lastly considered whether the District Court
abused its discretion when it did not permit D.S. to remain in the
United States.141 The Convention’s “mature-child” exception provides
that a court “may [ ] refuse to order the return of the child if it finds
that the child objects to being returned and has attained an age and
degree of maturity at which it is appropriate to take account of its

136
137

2008)).

Id.
Id. at 1164 (citing Altamiranda Vale v. Avila, 538 F.3d 581, 587 (7th Cir.

138

Id. at 1166.
Id.
140
Id. Nuevo León Civil Code identifies events and conditions when the right
of patria potestas (parental authority) will terminate, including death of the parent,
child’s emancipation by marriage, child abuse, etc. Código Civil para el Estado de
Nuevo Leon, arts. 443–48, Periódico Oficial 11-05-2016 (Mex.).
141
Garcia, 808 F.3d at 1167.
139
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views.”142 The Seventh Circuit agreed with the District Court that both
conditions of the mature-child exception were satisfied in this case,
namely D.S. objected to returning to Mexico and he achieved an age
and maturity where it was appropriate for the court to consider his
views.143 However, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the District Court’s
discretion not to apply the exception.144 The court reasoned that the
longer a child is wrongfully retained the more the child will acclimate
to the new country.145 This can provide perverse incentives for parents
to cause delays in Convention proceedings, which would frustrate the
Convention’s purpose to “secure the prompt return of children
wrongfully removed to or retained.”146
Underscoring its desire not to undermine the Convention by
permitting a child to stay in a country where he was wrongfully
retained, the Seventh Circuit found that the District Court did not
abuse its discretion in ordering D.S. to return to Mexico despite
satisfying the Mature Child exception.147
In summary, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment of the
district court and the district court’s order to return D.S. to Mexico.148
Galvan did not request rehearing on this case or file a petition for writ
of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court.

142

Hague Convention, art. 13, Oct. 25, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11670, 1343
U.N.T.S. 89 (1980).
143
Garcia, 808 F.3d at 1167.
144
Id.
145
Id. at 1169.
146
Id.; Hague Convention, art. 1.
147
Garcia, 808 F.3d at 1169.
148
Id.
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III. MARTINEZ V. CAHUE
A. The Facts
Jaded Mahelet Ruvalcaba Martinez (Martinez) and Peter Valdez
Cahue (Cahue) were in a relationship together, on and off, for nearly
ten years.149 They never married and did not frequently live
together.150 In 2006, Martinez gave birth to a son, A.M., in a suburb
near Chicago, Illinois.151 Cahue voluntarily acknowledged paternity of
A.M., and A.M. lived with Martinez from birth.152 In 2010, Martinez
and Cahue signed a private, written custody agreement that provided
Cahue liberal parenting time and that Cahue would “NOT fight
custody in court for [A.M.].”153 However, neither Martinez nor Cahue
attempted to “memorialize this arrangement in a court order.”154
In 2013, Martinez decided to relocate with the parties’ son to
Mexico, where she was a citizen.155 In Mexico, Martinez found
employment and enrolled A.M. in private school.156 A.M. excelled in
soccer, “spoke Spanish fluently, attended church regularly, and spent
time with extended family.”157
While Martinez and A.M. were in Mexico, Cahue consulted an
attorney about his rights under The Hague Convention.158 However,
Cahue never filed a petition under the Convention.159

149

Martinez v. Cahue, 826 F.3d 983, 987 (7th Cir. 2016).
Id. at 986.
151
Id. at 987.
152
Id.
153
Id.
154
Id.
155
Id.
156
Id.
157
Id.
158
Id.
159
Id.
150
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On October 16, 2013, Martinez “filed a petition against Cahue for
child support and an order of protection” in Mexico.160 However,
Martinez withdrew her petition before the Mexican court ruled on it.161
Shortly thereafter, Martinez and Cahue agreed to a visitation plan
where Cahue would have parenting time with A.M. during his school
vacations in December 2013, April 2014, and July 2014.162
In December 2013, A.M. did not visit Cahue as planned.163
Consequently, Cahue began corresponding with the U.S. Department
of State.164 He was again informed of his rights under The Hague
Convention and provided with “a blank petition for relief.”165
However, Cahue never filed the petition.166
Cahue’s parenting time with A.M. did proceed as planned in April
2014.167 However, in July 2014, Cahue only purchased a one-way
ticket for A.M., and Martinez refused to send A.M. to Illinois without
a round-trip ticket.168 Cahue complied and Martinez sent A.M. to
Illinois for the month of July.169
On August 16, 2014, Martinez went to the airport in Mexico to
pick up A.M., but he never arrived.170 Martinez called Cahue, who
claimed he had forgotten about the flight.171 Later, Cahue stopped
returning Martinez’s calls.172 On August 21, Cahue “contacted the

160

Id.
Id.
162
Id.
163
Id.
164
Id.
165
Id. at 987–88.
166
Id. at 988.
167
Id.
168
Id.
169
Id.
170
Id.
171
Id.
172
Id.
161
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State Department and asked it to put A.M.’s passport “on hold” so that
A.M. could not leave the United States.”173
On August 25, 2014, Martinez traveled to Illinois to retrieve her
174
son. She took A.M. from Cahue and returned to her parents’ home
in Illinois.175 In the Illinois circuit court, Cahue filed a petition for
custody and an emergency motion to prevent Martinez from relocating
with A.M. to Mexico.176 The Illinois circuit court granted Cahue’s
emergency motion and police seized A.M. from Martinez.177 Martinez
retained counsel and filed a response to Cahue’s custody petition.178
After a hearing on September 17, 2014, the Illinois court continued
Cahue’s physical possession of A.M. and “ordered the surrender of
A.M.’s U.S. and Mexican passports.”179
Martinez returned to Mexico.180 “On February 6, 2015, she filed
her petition under the Convention with the Mexican Central
Authority.”181 “The U.S. State Department received the petition on
March 13, 2015.”182
B. District Court Opinion
“[O]n December 15, 2015, after she discovered that Cahue had
obtained a new U.S. passport for A.M., Martinez commenced
emergency proceedings in the district court and filed her verified

173

Id.
Id.
175
Id.
176
Id.
177
Id.
178
Id.
179
Id.
180
Id.
181
Id.
182
Id.
174
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petition in the Northern District of Illinois for A.M.’s return to
Mexico.”183
The Northern District of Illinois held an evidentiary hearing on
the matter.184 The District Court found “that there was sufficient
evidence that A.M. had acclimated to Mexico during the year he lived
there with this mother.”185 However, the District Court also found that
the parties did not share an intent for A.M. to relocate to Mexico.186
Without “shared parental intent,” the District Court held that A.M.’s
habitual residence was Illinois, that Cahue’s retention of A.M. in
Illinois was therefore lawful, and dismissed Martinez’s petition.187
C. Appeal to the Seventh Circuit
Martinez appealed from the judgment of the Northern District of
Illinois to the Seventh Circuit.188 The case was heard by a panel
consisting of Chief Judge Wood and Judges Bauer and Flaum.189 At
issue for the court was (1) whether the district court properly identified
A.M.’s habitual residence and, if not, (2) whether the parties had any
defenses.190 Chief Judge Wood, writing a unanimous opinion, found
that Martinez had sole custody over A.M. under Illinois law and held
that Mexico was A.M.’s habitual residence.191 Finding that Cahue’s
retention of A.M. was wrongful under the Convention, the Seventh
Circuit reversed the district court, ordering A.M. to be returned to
Martinez in Mexico.192
183

Id.
Id.
185
Id.
186
Id.
187
Id.
188
Id.
189
Id. at 986.
190
Id. at 989–90.
191
Id. at 994.
192
Id.
184
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Habitual Residence

Chief Judge Wood began her opinion underscoring the purpose of
the Convention as “an anti-abduction treaty.”193 Chief Judge Wood
next identified that the habitual residence determination is a mixed
question of law and fact and that the standard of review of the district
court’s determination is de novo.194 She noted that de novo review is
essential both because the habitual residence determination is often
outcome determinative for Convention cases195 and “to assure both the
national and the international uniformity that the Convention was
designed to achieve.”196 The Seventh Circuit reviewed findings of
historical fact with deference.197
Next, Chief Judge Wood assessed the two primary factors for
determining habitual residence: (1) parental intent and (2) child’s
acclimatization to the proposed home jurisdiction.198 She noted that
the Seventh Circuit has tended to privilege parental intent but
emphasized the fact-specific nature of the inquiry.199
Regarding parental intent, the Seventh Circuit found that the
district court wrongly considered Cahue’s intent for A.M. to remain in
Illinois.200 Chief Judge Wood noted that “[t]he intention or purpose
which has to be taken into account is that of the person or persons
entitled to fix the place of the child’s residence.”201 The Seventh
Circuit found that Cahue never asserted his custody rights under the
193

Id. at 989. See supra Section The Hague Convention.
Martinez, 826 F.3d at 989.
195
Id. at 988 (“[I]f a child is currently located in her habitual residence, her
presence in the country (whether by removal or retention) is not wrongful.”).
196
Id. at 989.
197
Id.
198
Id. at 990.
199
Id.
200
Id. at 992.
201
Id. at 990 (quoting Redmond v. Redmond, 724 F.3d 729, 747 (7th Cir.
2013)) (emphasis in original).
194
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Convention.202 Although Martinez and Cahue had written visitation
agreements, neither Cahue nor Martinez ever entered them with a
court.203 The court refused to enforce the agreements as against public
policy.204 “In the absence of a court order, Illinois law presumes the
mother of a child [of unmarried parents] has sole custody.”205 As such,
“Cahue had no custody rights under Illinois law.”206
The Seventh Circuit also found that a noncustodial parent like
Cahue “has no right to determine the child’s location; he or she has
only the right to ask a court to supervise.”207 At no point did Cahue
invoke the Court’s powers to determine whether it was in A.M.’s best
interests to relocate to Mexico.208 The Seventh Circuit reasoned that
because Martinez had sole custody of A.M. under Illinois law and
under the Convention, only her intent—to relocate to Mexico—
mattered.209
Regarding the child’s acclimatization factor, the Seventh Circuit
noted that the district court found “A.M. had acclimatized to Mexico”
with “all of the indicia of habitual residence, including friends,
extended family, success in school, and participating in community
and religious activities.”210 The Seventh Circuit found the district
court’s findings were not clearly erroneous.211 Thus the Seventh
202

Martinez, 826 F.3d at 990.
Id. at 990–91.
204
Id.
205
Id. (citing 720 ILCS 5/10-5(a)(3)(2013) and 750 ILCS 45/14(a)(2) (2013)).
206
Martinez, 826 F.3d at 991.
207
Id. (citing 750 ILCS 5/609(a) (2013)). Section 609 of the IMDMA was
repealed in 2015. Act of July 21, 2015, sec. 5-20, 2015 Ill. Laws Pub. Act 99-90 (eff.
Jan. 1, 2016). However, a substantially similar provision exists in the new Section
609.2 of the IMDMA that replaces the term “removal” with “relocation.” Act of
July 21, 2015, sec. 5-15, § 609.2, 2015 Ill. Laws Pub. Act 99-90 (codified at 750 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/609.2, eff. Jan. 1, 2016).
208
Martinez, 826 F.3d at 991.
209
Id. at 992.
210
Id.
211
Id.
203
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Circuit held that because only Martinez’s intent to relocate to Mexico
was of legal significance in this matter and because A.M. had already
acclimatized to Mexico, Mexico was A.M.’s habitual residence.212
2.

Defenses and Aims of the Convention

The Seventh Circuit noted that because the district court found
Illinois to be A.M.’s habitual residence, the district court did not
consider the “wrongfulness of Cahue’s 2014 retention of A.M., or any
possible defenses that Cahue might have raised.”213 The Seventh
Circuit decided not to remand the case since the case was sufficiently
briefed and time-sensitive.214
The Seventh Circuit first considered whether Cahue violated
Martinez’s rights of custody under Mexican law.215 Noting that “Cahue
admit[ted] that he retained A.M. in Illinois without Martinez’s
consent,” the Seventh Circuit found that Cahue indeed violated
Martinez’s custody rights.216
Next, the Seventh Circuit considered whether any defenses Cahue
raised applied to his wrongful actions: (1) whether Martinez
acquiesced to his retention of A.M. or (2) whether “A.M. is now so
settled in his new environment that he should not be returned” to
Mexico.217 First, the Seventh Circuit found that Martinez never
acquiesced to Cahue’s retention of A.M. in Illinois because she
continuously exercised her custody rights by trying to remain in
contact with A.M. and to regain physical possession of A.M.218

212

Id.
Id.
214
Id.
215
Id. at 992–93.
216
Id. at 993.
217
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
218
Id.
213
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Second, the Seventh Circuit refused to apply the “settled-child”
defense for public policy reasons.219 The Seventh Circuit found that
Cahue had multiple opportunities to assert his parental rights but never
did so before his wrongful retention of A.M.220 Instead, Cahue
engaged in “self-help” by retaining A.M. in Illinois without permission
and filing a custody petition in Illinois.221 The Seventh Circuit noted
that “[t]he Convention achieves its aims both by returning children in
individual cases and by deterring future abductions or wrongful
retentions.”222 The Seventh Circuit found that returning A.M. to Cahue
would “be quite damaging to the deterrent effect of the
Convention.”223
In summary, the Seventh Circuit reversed the judgment of the
district court and ordered A.M. to be returned to Martinez in
Mexico.224 The Seventh Circuit denied rehearing and rehearing en
banc on July 29, 2016.225 On October 27, 2016, Cahue filed a petition
for writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court. As of March 11, 2017,
the petition for writ of certiorari remains pending and was distributed
for conference on March 17, 2017.

219

Id. at 993–94.
Id. at 993.
221
Id.
222
Id.
223
Id.
224
Id. at 994.
225
Martinez v. Cahue, 826 F.3d 983 (7th Cir. 2016), petition for cert. filed
(U.S. Oct. 27, 2016) (No. 16-582).
220
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IV. ANALYSIS
A. When Decision-making Parental Rights are Conferred
In both Garcia and Martinez, the natural fathers of the children at
issue formally acknowledged their paternity. 226 This is important in
both the United States and in Mexico. In both countries, a voluntary
acknowledgement of paternity will confer rights and duties on the
parent.227
However, in Mexico, patria potestas [parental authority] laws
give parents who have voluntarily acknowledged paternity the right to
exercise decision-making over the child’s life.228 In the United States,
no such rights are automatically conferred to a parent who has
voluntarily acknowledged paternity.229 Instead, the voluntary
acknowledgement of paternity serves as a basis from which a parent
can seek the court’s determination of custody issues.230 In jurisdictions
like Illinois, courts retain the power to make decisions about whether
one or both parents shall have custody in order to protect children’s

226

2015).

Martinez, 826 F.3d at 987; Garcia v. Pinelo, 808 F.3d 1158, 1160 (7th Cir.

227

E.g., Illinois Parentage Act of 2015, 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 46/305(a)
(West, Westlaw through Pub. Act 99-937, 2016 Reg. Sess.) (“[A] valid
acknowledgment [. . .] is equivalent to an adjudication of the parentage of a child
and confers upon the acknowledged father all of the rights and duties of a parent.”);
Código Civil Federal [CC], art. 412–14, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 1405-1928, últimas reformas DOF 24-12-2013 (Mex.).
228
Código Civil Federal [CC], art. 413; see Sedillo López, supra note 81, at
297.
229
See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 7573 (West, Westlaw through all 2016 Reg.
Sess. Laws, Ch. 8 of 2015-16 2d Ex. Sess.) (“The voluntary declaration of paternity
shall be recognized as a basis for the establishment of an order for child custody,
visitation, or child support.” (emphasis added)); Illinois Parentage Act of 2015,
§ 305(a)–(b).
230
See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 7573; Illinois Parentage Act of 2015,
§ 305(a)–(b).
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best interests.231 For example, Section 602.5(a) of the IMDMA
provides in pertinent part, “The court shall allocate decision-making
responsibilities according to the child’s best interests. Nothing in this
Act requires that each parent be allocated decision-making
responsibilities.”232 In this manner, custody rights in the United States
are not automatic—courts assign custody rights in the child’s best
interests.
Consequently, an unmarried parent who has voluntarily
acknowledged paternity and whose child’s country of habitual
residence follows the parental authority laws, like Mexico, will likely
have a right of custody on which to prevail in a Hague Convention
petition because the parental authority laws instill both parents with
rights to determine the child’s place of residence.233 In contrast, the
unmarried parent who has voluntarily acknowledged paternity and
whose child’s state of habitual residence is a state like Illinois will not
automatically have a right of custody under the Convention because
states like Illinois do not automatically confer decision-making powers
to such parents.234
These outcomes bore out in both Garcia and Martinez. In Garcia,
the parties’ child was born in Mexico.235 The child’s state of habitual
residence was Mexico.236 Under Mexican law, since Salazar
voluntarily acknowledged D.S. as his son, Salazar’s patria potestas
rights attached.237 Thus when Galvan refused to return D.S. to Mexico,

231

E.g., Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, 750 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 5/102(7) (West, Westlaw through Pub. Act. 99-937, 2016 Reg. Sess.).
232
Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, § 602.5(a) (emphasis
added).
233
Código Civil Federal [CC], art. 413; see Sedillo López, supra note 81, at
297.
234
See, e.g., Illinois Parentage Act of 2015, § 305(a)–(b).
235
Garcia v. Pinelo, 808 F.3d 1158, 1160 (7th Cir. 2015).
236
Id. at 1159.
237
Id. at 1166.
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she violated Salazar’s right of custody under The Convention and
parental authority laws to determine where D.S. should live.238
In contrast, in Martinez, the Seventh Circuit found that Cahue did
not have any rights of custody under the Convention.239 In Martinez,
although the parties’ child, A.M., was born in Illinois,240 Martinez took
A.M. to live in Mexico when he was seven years old.241 After sending
A.M. back to Illinois to visit his father for the summer, Cahue refused
to return A.M. to Mexico.242
Although Martinez filed a petition under the Convention to return
A.M. to Mexico, the Seventh Circuit first considered whether Martinez
wrongfully removed A.M. from Illinois in the first place.243 The
Seventh Circuit likely made the right call to do so because the purpose
of the Convention is to prevent parents from “obtain[ing] custody of
children by virtue of their wrongful removal or retention.”244 Martinez
should not prevail in her Convention petition if she removed A.M.
wrongly first.
However, the Seventh Circuit found that Cahue took no action to
assert his custody rights before he engaged in “self-help” to keep A.M.
in Illinois.245 As mentioned above, Cahue’s voluntary
acknowledgement of paternity only made him a parent; Illinois did not
automatically confer custody rights to Cahue by virtue of his paternity
acknowledgment.246 Because Cahue did not assert his parental rights
in court before he retained A.M. in Illinois, he triggered the default
238

Id. at 1159.
Martinez v. Cahue, 826 F.3d 983, 991 (7th Cir. 2016).
240
Id. at 987.
241
Id.
242
Id. at 988.
243
Id. at 990.
244
International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 22 U.S.C.A. § 9001(a)(2)
(West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-327).
245
Martinez, 826 F.3d at 990.
246
See Illinois Parentage Act of 2015, 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 46/305(a)–
(b) (West, Westlaw through Pub. Act. 99-937, 2016 Reg. Sess.).
239
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custody laws in Illinois, which provide that “[i]n the absence of a court
order, Illinois law presumes that the mother of a child [of unmarried
parents] has sole custody.”247 Consequently, in the absence of a court
order, Martinez had sole custody of A.M. and sole discretion as to
where A.M. would live.248 Thus, under the Convention, Martinez did
not violate any of Cahue’s rights of custody by removing A.M. to
Mexico because Cahue did not have any under Illinois law to begin
with.249
But what about the private custody agreement Martinez and
Cahue signed in 2010 promising Cahue liberal parenting time?250
Article III of the Convention provides in part that rights of custody
may arise “by reason of an agreement having legal effect under the law
of that State.”251 The commentaries to the Convention state that for
private agreements to have legal effect they must not be prohibited by
law.252
As discussed above in Part I.B.1., private contracts or agreements
related to child custody are generally unenforceable as against public
policy in the United States.253 Only custody agreements supervised
and approved by the court are permissible so that courts protect
children’s best interests through the supervisory process.254 Cahue
never attempted to memorialize his agreement with Martinez in a court
order.255 As such, the private agreement was void as against public

247

Martinez, 826 F.3d at 990–91; Illinois Parentage Act of 2015, § 802(c).
Martinez, 826 F.3d at 991.
249
Id.
250
Id. at 987.
251
Hague Convention, art. 3, Oct. 25, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11670, 1343
U.N.T.S. 89 (1980).
252
Perez-Vera Report, supra note 44, ¶ 70.
253
E.g., In re Marriage of Linta, 2014 IL App (2d) 130862, ¶ 14, 18 N.E.3d
566, 570; Hurlbut v. Scarbrough, 957 P.2d 839, 842 (Wyo. 1998).
254
E.g., In re Marriage of Best, 901 N.E.2d 967, 970–71 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009).
255
Martinez v. Cahue, 826 F.3d 983, 987 (7th Cir. 2016).
248
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policy and did not serve as an example of Cahue asserting his parental
rights.
What about the court order resulting from Cahue’s petition for
custody in Illinois?256 This court order was filed after Cahue retained
A.M. in Illinois without Martinez’s permission.257 Article 17 of the
Convention provides in pertinent part:
The sole fact that a decision relating to custody has been
given in or is entitled to recognition in the requested State
shall not be a ground for refusing to return a child under this
Convention, but the judicial or administrative authorities of
the requested State may take account of the reasons for that
decision in applying this Convention.258
The purpose of Article 17 is to “ensure, inter alia, that the Convention
takes precedence over decrees made in favor of abductors before the
court had notice of the wrongful removal or retention.”259 Cahue’s
court order in Illinois is exactly the type of order the Convention
contemplates. Cahue knew he could get a favorable hearing in Illinois
and so he engaged in self-help by retaining A.M. in Illinois and sought
refuge in its court system. The Convention is designed to halt court
orders that would give effect to Cahue’s attempts to circumvent
Martinez’s parental rights. As such, the court orders issued in response
to custody petitions after Cahue’s retention of A.M. in Illinois cannot
evince efforts to assert parental rights before A.M.’s retention in
Illinois.

256

Id. at 988.
Id.
258
Hague Convention, art. 17, Oct. 25, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11670, 1343
U.N.T.S. 89 (1980).
259
Hague International Child Abduction Convention: Text and Legal Analysis,
51 Fed. Reg. 10,494, 10,504 (Mar. 26, 1986).
257
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B. How Outcomes Would Have Been Different
1.

Garcia v. Pinelo

In Garcia, the Seventh Circuit found that Salazar had a right of
custody under the Convention because he had a parental authority
right under Nuevo León state laws by voluntarily acknowledging
paternity of D.S.260 But what if Nuevo León, Mexico did not have
parental authority laws and instead followed the laws of Illinois?
In that case, Salazar would not have a right of custody under the
Convention. Even though the parties did have a custody order from the
court,261 Salazar still would not have a right of custody because
Galvan was allocated physical custody of D.S. while Salazar was
allocated weekly visitation.262 Under the Convention, Salazar’s court
approved weekly visitation is not a right of custody—a right to
determine the child’s place of residence.263 Instead, Salazar has a
“right of access.”264
Although Salazar would not have a right of custody to prevent
Galvan from automatically retaining D.S. in the United States, Salazar
would have rights arising out of the original court order allocating
custody and visitation.265 The parties’ court order would enable
Salazar to ask a court in either Illinois or Mexico to conduct a hearing
to determine whether it is in D.S.’s best interests to remain in
Illinois.266 In this manner, because Galvan and Salazar had a
260

Garcia v. Pinelo, 808 F.3d 1158, 1166 (7th Cir. 2015).
Id. at 1160.
262
Id.
263
Hague Convention, art. 5(a), Oct. 25, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11670, 1343
U.N.T.S. 89 (1980).
264
Id.
265
Id. arts. 3 & 21.
266
Id. art. 21; Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, 750 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/413(b)(2) (West, Westlaw through Pub. Act 99-937, 2016 Reg.
Sess.); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/609.2(g) (West, Westlaw through Pub. Act 99261
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preexisting, court-approved custody agreement, Galvan’s ability to
relocate is encumbered by Salazar’s right to petition the court to make
a best interest determination.
2.

Martinez v. Cahue

The outcome would also be different in Martinez if Cahue could
rely on parental authority laws. Unlike Salazar, Cahue did not have a
court order allocating him any rights of custody or visitation.267 Thus
Cahue could not overcome the default custody presumption under
Illinois law and the Seventh Circuit found that only Martinez’s
parental intent was relevant.268
However, in a scenario where Cahue has parental authority rights,
the Seventh Circuit likely would find that it would have to consider
both Martinez’s and Cahue’s intent. Because Cahue, like Salazar,
voluntarily acknowledged paternity of his child, the right of parental
authority would attach immediately. With the right of parental
authority, Cahue would have a right of custody on which to rely in a
Convention petition.
In this manner, when Martinez left Illinois to move to Mexico, he
could have filed a Hague petition to return A.M. to Illinois because the
parties lacked mutual intent for A.M. to relocate. Martinez would have
an encumbered right of custody where she would be unable to relocate
without a court determining whether relocation was in the child’s best
interests.
C. What’s the Better Rule?
Mexico’s parental authority rights and Illinois’s presumption that
an unmarried mother has sole legal custody of her children in the
937, 2016 Reg. Sess.); Código Civil Federal [CC], art. 416, Diario Oficial de la
Federación [DOF] 14-05-1928, últimas reformas DOF 24-12-2013 (Mex.).
267
Martinez v. Cahue, 826 F.3d 983, 987 (7th Cir. 2016).
268
Id. at 991.
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absence of a court order reflect different policy considerations.
Ultimately, Illinois’s presumption is the better rule because children’s
best interests are better protected.
Parental authority rights, as originally conceived and as they have
evolved in jurisdictions like Mexico, stand for the proposition that
parenthood is rooted in the natural order of the world.269 As a natural
consequence of the parent-child relationship, certain parental rights
and powers automatically arise at a child’s birth or a parent’s voluntary
acknowledgment of paternity.270 In other words, both parents—
regardless of marital status—have natural rights to make decisions
about their children by virtue of the parent-child relationship.271
However, in jurisdictions like Illinois, no such natural rights exist
for unmarried fathers or partners of unmarried mothers. The parens
patriae doctrine subordinates the natural rights of parents so that the
State—through the courts—can guarantee that parents pursue their
children’s best interests despite the parents’ separated or divorced
status.272
As discussed above, in the absence of a court order allocating
parental responsibilities, Illinois law presumes unmarried mothers
have sole legal custody of their children.273 The historical and practical
reason for this presumption is that maternity usually is not questioned
since a biological mother is present at birth.274
Illinois’s presumption that an unmarried mother retains sole legal
custody of her children in the absence of a court order is predicated on
the assumption that unmarried fathers are not involved in raising their
269

Begné, supra note 22, at 528.
Id.
271
Id. at 527.
272
46 AM. JUR. 2D Juvenile Courts, Etc. § 19 (2016).
273
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/10-5(a)(3) (West, Westlaw through Pub.
Act. 99-937, 2016 Reg. Sess.); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 46/802(c) (West,
Westlaw through Pub. Act 99-937, 2016 Reg. Sess.).
274
See, e.g., CENT. MINN. LEGAL SERVS. UNMARRIED FATHERS’ GUIDE TO
PATERNITY, CUSTODY, PARENTING TIME AND CHILD SUPPORT IN MINNESOTA 5 (3d
rev. ed. 2011).
270
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children when the parents have not entered into a custody agreement.
Presuming for a moment that this assumption is correct, enabling a
parent to assert rights of custody for the first time in a Convention
proceeding would undermine the stability of the children’s status quo
where their mother made significant parenting decisions alone.
However, the assumption that the absence of a court order
signifies a lack of parental involvement may, in fact, not be true. As
previously mentioned, many unmarried couples with children prefer to
follow informal parenting arrangements without court orders.275
Additionally, going to court is expensive and requiring unmarried
parents to formalize their parenting arrangements in court may place a
high burden on the most vulnerable unmarried parents.276
Despite these shortcomings, Illinois’s presumption that an
unmarried mother has sole legal custody of her children in the absence
of a court order remains the better public policy. Allowing parents to
assert rights of custody for the first time through parental authority
rights enables such parents to circumvent children’s best interests
through gamesmanship.
For example, in Martinez v. Cahue, Peter Cahue consulted an
attorney regarding his legal options.277 Yet he never followed through
with filing a petition to allocate parental responsibilities and parenting
time.278 He also researched his rights under The Hague Convention.279
But knowing, in his own words, “[he] wouldn’t have won,” Cahue
engaged in self-help by retaining A.M. in Illinois against Jaded
Martinez’s wishes and deploying the Illinois courts to secure favorable
custody orders.280 If Cahue had parental authority rights, he would be
able to disturb the status quo without any court having previously

275

See Maldonado, supra note 16, at 355–56.
BOWMAN, supra note 5, at 222.
277
Martinez v. Cahue, 826 F.3d 983, 987 (7th Cir. 2016).
278
Id.
279
Id.
280
Id. at 993.
276
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considered A.M.’s best interests. Such a result rewards custodial
gamesmanship rather than protecting A.M.’s best interests.
A primary aim of the Convention is to deter parents from not only
child abductions and wrongful retentions281 but also adversarial
gamesmanship involving children.282 Such gamesmanship can take
many forms, but courts are particularly concerned about deterring
custodial parents from bargaining to retain legal and physical custody
of their children by accepting reduced support payments.283 In Garska
v. McCoy, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia noted:
[W]e are concerned to prevent the issue of custody from
being used in an abusive way as a coercive weapon to affect
the level of support payments and the outcome of other issues
in the underlying divorce proceeding. Where a custody fight
emanates from this reprehensible motive the children
inevitably become pawns to be sacrificed in what ultimately
becomes a very cynical game.284
Because adversarial gamesmanship, e.g., accepting lower support
payments to retain custody, would not be in the children’s best
interests, courts in jurisdictions like Illinois make best interest
determinations in custody proceedings to make sure that the
children—who often do not have a voice in the custody proceeding
itself—are protected from the adversarial process.
Illinois’s presumption is a better rule because it is narrow. The
presumption only applies in the absence of a court order.285 Where
281

Hague Convention, Preamble, Oct. 25, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11670, 1343
U.N.T.S. 89 (1980).
282
See Hague International Child Abduction Convention: Text and Legal
Analysis, 51 Fed. Reg. 10,494, 10,504 (Mar. 26, 1986).
283
E.g., Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 362 (W.Va 1981).
284
Id. at 361.
285
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/10-5(a)(3) (West, Westlaw through Pub.
Act. 99-937, 2016 Reg. Sess.); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 46/802(c) (West,
Westlaw through Pub. Act. 99-937, 2016 Reg. Sess.).
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unmarried parents have voluntarily acknowledged paternity and
sought the court’s relief to adjudicate each parent’s custody rights, the
presumption will not apply.286 Under The Hague Convention, a parent
with a court order predating the alleged wrongful abduction or
retention will more easily be able to argue that rights of custody or
access exist.287 Moreover, even if a parent only has rights of access,
the parent can still request under the Convention that Contracting
States enforce and protect the rights of access.288
More importantly, if the parties obtain a custody judgment
contemporaneously with a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity,
then the parties will have gone through a process where the court has
considered the child’s best interests.289 In contrast, an unmarried
parent without a custody order who relies on parental authority laws as
a right of custody under the Convention may not have had a court ever
previously consider the child’s best interests. This essentially means
that such a parent could assert his rights for the first time in court by
filing a petition under the Convention rather than when the parent
voluntarily acknowledged paternity in the first place.
Whether a parent asserted parental rights before asserting rights of
custody in a petition under the Convention matters because stability is
important in children’s lives.290 Courts and practitioners agree that
fostering stability in the midst of a family’s breakup is in children’s

286

720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/10-5(a)(3); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
46/802(c).
287
See Hague International Child Abduction Convention: Text and Legal
Analysis, 51 Fed. Reg. 10,494, 10,506–07 (Mar. 26, 1986).
288
Hague Convention, supra note 14, at art. 21, 1343 U.N.T.S. at 102.
289
E.g., Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, 750 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 5/602.5 (West, Westlaw through Pub. Act 99-904, 2016 Reg. Sess.).
290
E.g., In re Marriage of Davis, 792 N.E.2d 391, 394 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003). See
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.05 cmt. i (AM. LAW INST. 2002) [hereinafter ALI
Principles].
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best interests.291 Consequently, courts applying the best interests
standard will often favor maintaining the status quo of custody
arrangements in order to prevent disruption in children’s lives.292
V. CONCLUSION
As this article goes to print, the U.S. Supreme Court will decide
whether to grant Cahue’s petition for writ of certiorari. Cahue’s actions
are exactly the kind that the Hague Convention is meant to deter—self
help and litigious gamesmanship at the expense of a child’s best
interests. Illinois’s presumption that an unmarried mother has sole
custody of her children in the absence of a court order prevents parents
like Cahue from using the Hague Convention and laws like it to their
tactical advantage. Although social trends in the United States point to
less formal relationships—e.g., avoidance of the institution of
marriage—and informal parenting arrangements, such informal
parenting arrangements do not protect children’s best interests in the
unhappy event the unmarried parents cannot agree as to how to raise
their children. Requiring unmarried fathers or partners of unmarried
mothers to obtain a court order to define their custodial rights adds
formality to the family status that should help protect the children’s
interests. In all likelihood, the Supreme Court will deny Cahue’s
petition for writ of certiorari. But if it does grant certiorari, the Court
should affirm the Seventh Circuit.

291

cmt. i.

E.g., Davis, 792 N.E.2d at 394; See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 290, § 2.05

292

E.g., Davis, 792 N.E.2d at 394 (citing In re Marriage of Nolte, 609 N.E.2d
381, 385 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993)); Sullivan v. Knick, 568 S.E.2d 430, 435 (Va. App. Ct.
2002).
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